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A Study on Optimal Capacities of a New Cruise Line with Quadratic Operating Cost using Stackelberg Game Model
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | Seong-Cheol Cho | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Wei Wei | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-12-16T02:45:05Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2019-12-16T02:45:05Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repository.kmou.ac.kr/handle/2014.oak/11484 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://kmou.dcollection.net/jsp/common/DcLoOrgPer.jsp?sItemId=000002380071 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | The cruise industry has grown rapidly since the 1990s and today represents one of the healthiest sectors in the shipping industry, with newer and bigger vessel on order. With the capacity of cruise companies increasing steadily, competition in the market has also become fiercer in several regions. This research study, aims at investigating a market strategy which smaller cruise lines could adopt in order to gain market shares and compete with bigger players. This thesis develops and applies a Stackelberg Game Model to find out what factors are important for a new cruise line penetrating into a particular market. Using the concept of Nash equilibrium, the optimal capacity of the follower, and then the total capacity and the price of the cruise market are computed. Numerical examples with artificial market data are used to derive the most significant managerial implications that could help boosting the share of cruise market for the new entrants (followers). They show how the new entrants (followers) get a suitable way to have a larger market share. Findings of thesis study could be useful for a beginning small cruise line to develop the marketing strategies to increase its market share after entering the cruise market. In addition, this study also provides a method for controlling the variable cost of the follower. KEYWORDS: Nash Equilibrium, Stackelberg Game Model, Marketing Strategies, Cruise Line, Optimal Capacity | - |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Background of Study 1 1.2 Research Problem 2 1.3 Purpose of the Study 5 1.4 Thesis Outline 6 2 Literature Survey 7 2.1 Introduction of the game theory 7 2.1.1 History of Game Theory 7 2.1.2 Concept of Game Theory 7 2.1.3 Classification of game theory 10 2.2 Cournot and Stankelberg model 14 2.2.1 Cournot Model 14 2.2.2 Stackelberg Model 15 2.2.3 Comparing with Cournot and Stackelberg Model 16 2.2.4 Why choose Stackelberg Model 18 2.3 Existing reasearching 19 3 MODEL AND ANALYSIS 22 3.1 Model and assumptions 22 3.1.1 Introducing the differences of the cost function 24 3.1.2 Calculating the optimal monopoly capacity of Line 1 27 3.1.3 Calculating the optimal capacity of Line 2 27 3.2 Optimal capacities for Line 1 and Line 2 28 3.3 Analysis on variable cost and dajustment parameter 31 3.3.1 Analysis on variable cost of Line 2 31 3.3.2 Analysis on adjustment parameter of Line 2 32 3.4 Numerical Examples 35 3.4.1 Analysis on the numerical examples 40 3.4.2 The managerial implications of increasing market share of Line 2 48 4 CONCULSION 51 4.1 Summary and Conclusions 50 4.2 Limitations of this thesis 55 4.3 Future research direction 55 References 57 Acknowledgments 61 | - |
| dc.format.extent | viii, 61 p. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | 한국해양대학교 대학원 | - |
| dc.rights | 한국해양대학교 논문은 저작권에 의해 보호받습니다. | - |
| dc.title | A Study on Optimal Capacities of a New Cruise Line with Quadratic Operating Cost using Stackelberg Game Model | - |
| dc.type | Dissertation | - |
| dc.date.awarded | 2017-08 | - |
| dc.contributor.department | 대학원 해운경영학과 | - |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | 한국해양대학교 대학원 | - |
| dc.description.degree | Master | - |
| dc.subject.keyword | Nash Equilibrium, Stackelberg Game Model, Marketing Strategies, Cruise Line, Optimal Capacity | - |
| dc.identifier.holdings | 000000001979▲000000007040▲000002380071▲ | - |
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