항만분야 공적개발원조(ODA)의 딜레마구조와 해결방안

Abstract

In accordance with the globalization age, countries in the world try to dedicate to collaboration between them through ODA(Official Development Assistance) in order to solve the-rich-get-richer and the poop-get-poorer among countries, to develop the developing countries' economy and to improve their level of social welfare. Korea is also active in ODA as the member of OECD/DAC and recently importance of ODA in the field of ports has been brought into relief and it in the initial process. However, if the giving countries' assistance repeats unconditionally, the developing countries become to expect and believe that the developed countries would help them again in case of problems and have no inspirations or motivation to make their efforts in order to solve the problems or to develop economy by themselves. In this case, the 'system' play an important role to provide motivations to their action. These ODA situation can be explained by the model of 'Samaritan's Dilemma' by Buchanan. The model is deal with in the perspective of game theory and previous literatures discussed just issue of motivation of ODA under the one-shot game. However, substantial ODA situations occur very repeatedly and issue of information as well as that of motivation can affect occurrence of dilemma. Therefore, through model of dilemma including both repeated game situations and information problem, occurrence structure of dilemma of ODA may be understood.

Accordingly, the study analyze dilemma structure of ODA in the field of ports applying point of view of new institutionalism and game structure of Samaritan's dilemma and seeks improvements of system to create effective results based on it.

As the results, first, regarding to information system, the system to acquire information on the assisted countries is not well organized. And without any specific agencies with assignment,there is lack of specific information and it takes longer time to prepare contractions and its execution. And because collaboration between governmental ministries are weak, there may be overlapping in assignments. The field inquiry system is consideratively poor and there is limit to acquire accurate information in the field, as well. And then there is no system to observe corruptions due to invisible activities by the assisted countries.

So systematic management by professionals and institutional arrangement for professionalism and efficiency are required and system to acquire information including seminars between related countries and related commissions should be consolidated. In regard to the field inquiry, it should enhance the assistance system focusing on the field and if necessary, it may be considered to assign right of the field inquiry to multilateral assistance organizations. The system to observe corruptions in the assisted countries should be introduced, too.

Second, concerning pay-off system, Korea can be compensated by mutual assistance with the assisted country, economical compensation, human right compensation and higher image in international society. The assisted country can get economic compensation from construction of harbors. In case of construction of harbors, it cannot be executed by the government only and it requires assistance by professional construction companies or public organizations. Accordingly, there has been a transitional stage to prepare legal and policy systems to lead collaboration with them. And there are no legal and official policy and unofficial systems to require the assisted countries' efforts.

So it is necessary to reorganize and establish related legal and policy systems in order to collaborate related companies and public organizations in Korea. And in order to induce collaboration with the assisted country, it needs to introduce systems of providing obligation including participation in project of inviting trainees after concluding contract on constructing harbors, adjusting property compensation of the assisted countries or giving compensation according to their efforts.

Third, in regard to choice systems, even though officials in charge of assistance in both Korea and the assisted countries can choose various strategies(actions) about ODA, they tend to continue to conclude ODA repeatedly. Accordingly, the assisted countries become to expect future assistance and as assistance is repeated, they tend to request assistances from the giving country.

Therefore, in order to induce the assisted country's self-efforts, it needs to establish systems to minimize the assistance or to provide bigger compensation in case of efforts by the assisted country. And if the assisted country shows no will to create effective results of the project or its attitude is negligent in the process of the project, it may be considered to introduce the system to stop the project and not to provide assistance in the future.

Hence, the study has its own significance in restructuring, suggesting and analyzing the dilemma model of ODA and based on the results, it will contribute to theoretical development of ODA. And it analyzes the system of Korean ODA in the field of ports and makes suggestions to improve it, it is expected to contribute to create efficient results of ODA in the field of ports.